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Essay 
Time to Make Lemonade from the 
Lemons of the Kelo Case 
DWIGHT MERRIAM 
The decision in Kelo v. New London only addressed the 
constitutionality of the eminent domain process used to take Susette Kelo’s 
home. Given the four corners of the case as presented to the Court, there 
was no consideration of alternatives to eminent domain and of the equity 
issues inherent in eminent domain. In responding to the essay by Horton 
and Levesque the author looks to ways to enable development and 
redevelopment through means less coercive than eminent domain and 
more respectful of private property rights and the unique and personal 
situations of those whose properties are targeted. The author, noting the 
almost unbridled power of government in eminent domain takings and the 
relative weakness of condemnees, offers suggestions to improve equity and 
to allocate the true costs of direct takings. This Essay serves as a roadmap 
for reform. 
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Time to Make Lemonade from the 
Lemons of the Kelo Case 
DWIGHT MERRIAM* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This commentary on Horton and Levesque had the potential to be the 
shortest ever. On first reading I thought I might agree with nearly all they 
had to say. They are, for the most part, spot on in describing the facts and 
the litigation. The denouement, cleverly preserved for future use with the 
four words (precedent, federalism, compensation, democracy) Horton 
planted at the end of oral argument, is enlightening and entertaining, and 
perpetuates the ability to argue the case long after the red light on the 
lectern went dark. Witness here, more than a decade later, Horton 
continues on in print.  
It is what Horton and Levesque do not say that is of interest.1 They 
describe the jurisprudence in a way that makes one think that, if a movie 
were to be made about eminent domain, the Berman-Midkiff-Kelo2 refrain 
would make a good sequel to Bill Murray’s Groundhog Day.3 As Horton 
and Levesque claim, Kelo “is the correct decision based on the facts of the 
case in the existing precedents . . . . Everyone should slow down, take a 
deep breath, and conclude that the sky is not falling.”4 
                                                                                                                          
* Dwight H. Merriam, FAICP, of the law firm of Robinson & Cole LLP, is a Fellow and Past 
President of the American Institute of Certified Planners and Past Chair of the ABA Section of State 
and Local Government Law. He has taught land use law at Vermont Law School, UConn Law School, 
and Quinnipiac Law School, and has published over 200 articles and ten books, including co-editing 
Eminent Domain Use and Abuse: Kelo in Context (ABA 2006) and serving as co-editor of the leading 
treatise in the field, Rathkopf’s Zoning and Planning Law and lead author of the casebook, Planning 
and Control of Land Development. UMass BA (cum laude), UNC MRP, and Yale JD. 
1 It is probably nothing more than the innocent narrowness of their perspective. As psychologist 
Abraham Maslow said, “I suppose it is tempting, if the only tool you have is a hammer, to treat 
everything as if it were a nail.” ABRAHAM MASLOW, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SCIENCE (1966). This is 
probably based on philosopher Abraham Kaplan’s statement: “Give a small boy a hammer, and he will 
find that everything he encounters needs pounding.” ABRAHAM KAPLAN, THE CONDUCT OF INQUIRY 
(1964). Horton and Levesque are among the most highly regarded appellate lawyers. They are not 
urban planners, elected councilmembers, people whose homes are taken for redevelopment, developers, 
or financiers. 
2 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984); 
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
3 GROUNDHOG DAY (Columbia Pictures 1993). 
4 Wesley W. Horton & Brendon P. Levesque, Kelo Is Not Dred Scott, 48 CONN. L. REV. 1405, 
1425 (2016). 
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This is familiar territory for me, because I have studied property rights 
and the Kelo case, co-authoring a book on the former5 and shortly after the 
decision, co-editing a book on the latter.6 I did not represent any of the 
parties in the case, but I did follow the build-up in the practice and 
jurisprudence of eminent domain long before there was even a vision for 
the Fort Trumbull development. I see missed opportunities in the decision 
and its aftermath for planners; public officials; federal, state, and local 
government; and the courts to improve the process of public land assembly 
for the benefit of all the stakeholders. Eminent domain need not be a zero 
sum game. At the very least it can be kinder and gentler. As a practitioner 
observing the real world impacts of the Kelo decision in the decade since, I 
am struck by how we have failed to learn much from the losses suffered on 
all sides in this case and in the countless others like it, large and small, all 
over this country. 
Let us consider what Horton and Levesque did not say in describing 
what those four words bring to the discussion of this case specifically and 
eminent domain generally. 
II. THE PRELUDE (“PRECEDENT”) 
A.  The Law 
The prelude to Kelo is in the case law and practice of eminent domain 
over many decades preceding it, and in what was and was not done in the 
Fort Trumbull redevelopment itself. “Precedent” is the first of Horton’s 
four words.7 Kelo did not change the law and is consistent with the 
precedent of Berman and Midkiff.8 Agreed. But as the aphorism “two 
wrongs don’t make a right” might instruct us, the consensus that no new 
law was created in Kelo leaves us nowhere. Horton and Levesque are 
correct in observing that Berman was broad in its language.9 In Berman the 
plaintiffs’ perfectly good, non-blighted department store was wiped out in 
the name of redevelopment.10 Berman should leave us asking, as so many 
still do, how far governmental land assembly should be allowed to go in 
taking properties that are not themselves in need of redevelopment but can 
contribute to the assemblage value or be transformed into more lucrative 
                                                                                                                          
5 R. MELTZ ET AL., THE TAKINGS ISSUE (1999). 
6 EMINENT DOMAIN USE AND ABUSE:  KELO IN CONTEXT (Dwight H. Merriam & Mary Massaron 
Ross eds., 2005). Mary Massaron Ross and I had the most fun in interviewing Wesley Horton and Scott 
Bullock, who argued for Kelo. Our conversation became a chapter in the book and relates some 
interesting back-stories. See id. at 291–320. 
7 Horton & Levesque, supra note 4, at 1414. 
8 Id. at 1414–16. 
9 Id. at 1415. 
10 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 30–31 (1954). 
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uses in the fashion of a Motel 6 giving way to a Ritz Carlton.11  
Midkiff, sui generis perhaps given its unique facts coming from the 
state which is the only former monarchy to join the union,12 probably does 
go even further than Berman, as Horton and Levesque say.13 The idea was 
to enable the breakup of the landowner oligopoly that was the consequence 
of the feudal land system under the monarchy. The eminent domain 
program of Midkiff did not succeed in doing what it was intended to do. It 
made things worse by incorporating into the purchase of a home the entire 
value of the fee interest in the underlying land, rather than enabling a 
purchaser to buy just the improvements and pay a monthly rent on the 
land.14 It has created a higher barrier to the entry into homeownership, 
rather than facilitating it. Midkiff should make us ask whether we ought to 
consider, and if so to what extent, the expectation of success before the 
government is allowed to unleash its extraordinary power of eminent 
domain to seize private property. The standard as to the probability of 
success in the post-Kelo world, reiterating precedent, is that government 
has no obligation to demonstrate to any degree that a redevelopment 
project will succeed. Government does not even have to mouth the words. 
The trial record in Kelo includes the admission by the developer that there 
was essentially no market for building in the area.15 
B.  The Process 
What Horton and Levesque do not address is the process itself and 
what could have and should have been done differently. This is the 
precedent of the public policy and process of deciding when and how to 
use eminent domain that has been perpetuated post-Kelo. It deserves close 
scrutiny and should not be accepted simply because that has been the way 
that business was always done, apparently ratified by Kelo. For some 
backstory, read Jeff Benedict’s somewhat one-sided book, Little Pink 
                                                                                                                          
11 For a succinct criticism of the decision, see Amy Lavine, Urban Renewal and the Story of 
Berman v. Parker, 42 URBAN LAW. 287 (2009). 
12 Prior to joining the United States as a territory under an American governor and, eventually, a 
state, Hawaii was a monarchy. See JAMES L. HALEY, CAPTIVE PARADISE: A HISTORY OF HAWAII, at 
xix (2014) (showing the kings and queens of Hawaii). 
13 Horton & Levesque, supra note 4, at 1416. 
14 See J. GORDON HYLTON ET AL., PROPERTY LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 221 (2d ed. 2003) (discussing social redistribution as a public use: “Both Midkiff and 
Berman v. Parker are examples of social redistribution. In Midkiff, title to land was taken from its 
owners and transferred to Lessees . . . Title transfers have occurred under this statute upheld in Midkiff, 
but housing costs have increased because homeowners must now pay for a full title rather than monthly 
rental under a lease. Note that Justice O’Connor acknowledged the act might not be successful in 
achieving its intended goals.”). 
15 “The trial court relied on testimony that ‘market conditions do not justify construction of new 
commercial space . . . on a speculative basis.’” Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 598 (Conn. 
2004) (Zarella, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), aff’d, 545 U.S. at 490 (2005). 
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House.16 The take-away from his account is that Susette Kelo and her 
neighbors, some of whom, when you learn their stories, you will find even 
more sympathetic than Kelo, is that they were treated poorly in the 
process.17 The next media play for this case is the upcoming movie in 
which Catherine Keener portrays Susette Kelo.18 The Kelo case just keeps 
on giving.19 
III. WHY THE HURRY? 
If you follow the history of the Fort Trumbull redevelopment process, 
you will sense that there was great urgency to acquire and clear the 
property that drove the process.20 Why? In part, the real estate market was 
strong and the redevelopment authority had a capable developer waiting in 
the wings.21 The other factor is a phenomenon of redevelopment generally: 
the almost obsessive-compulsive urge to own, control, clear, and make 
                                                                                                                          
16 JEFF BENEDICT, LITTLE PINK HOUSE: A TRUE STORY OF DEFIANCE AND COURAGE (2009); see 
also Dahlia Lithwick, Driven Out, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/15/ 
books/review/Lithwick-t.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/TW6G-S8ZH] (“The investigative reporter Jeff 
Benedict has decided to cast Kelo in the style of Julia Roberts as Erin Brockovich. But this comes at 
some journalistic cost: by the time he’s finished introducing us to his protagonist (who ‘had a body that 
defied the fact that she had delivered five children. Her fiery red hair ran all the way down to her 
waist’), he risks having written the world’s first bodice-ripper about the takings clause.”). 
17 BENEDICT, supra note 16.   
18 Brian Hallenbeck, ‘Pink House’ Author Tickled at Casting of Movie’s Lead Role, THE DAY 
(Sept. 17, 2015, 4:41 PM), http://www.theday.com/article/20150917/NWS01/150919356 [https://perm 
a.cc/W9SQ-64X4]; see also Ilya Somin, Forthcoming Film About Kelo v. City of New London, WASH. 
POST (June 23, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/06/23/a-
forthcoming-documentary-on-kelo-v-city-of-new-london/ [https://perma.cc/9AC8-KDFL]. The film’s 
producers, Ted Balaker and Courtney Balaker, are making it in collaboration with the Institute for 
Justice, which represented Kelo, and they had this to say in an op-ed piece in USA Today:  
The Constitution once limited how governments could use eminent domain, but 
post-Kelo, that’s no longer the case. Officials routinely lock arms with corporations 
or billionaires to forcibly transfer property from one private owner to another, not 
for public use, but for private gain. . . . How to tame the ugly spirit of eminent 
domain abuse and cronyism? We suggest turning to a force mightier than politics: 
culture. We are producing a feature film based on Kelo’s historic saga, and we hope 
to achieve some of the impact garnered by Erin Brockovich, another underdog film 
about a real-life working-class woman. 
Id.   
19 A video embedded in a report on the upcoming movie is interesting because not only is the 
landmark Thames River mispronounced, a local oddity for sure, but more importantly the interviewee 
director Courtney Balaker mistakenly believes a finding of blight was required. Nick Gillespie & 
Alexis Garcia, Kelo Decision Coming to Big Screen in Little Pink House, REASON.COM (July 27, 
2015), http://reason.com/reasontv/2015/07/27/kelo-decision-little-pink-house [https://perma.cc/2HSD-
LQ2L]. 
20 See Ted Mann, A ‘Wrong Turn’: From Giddy Optimism to Stunning Disappointment, THE DAY 
(Nov. 11, 2009, 2:06 AM), http://www.theday.com/article/20091111/BIZ02/311119888 [https://per 
ma.cc/SK2Y-3L7H] (discussing the history of the Fort Trumbull development process). 
21 YALE URBAN DESIGN WORKSHOP, FORT TRUMBULL VISION 15 (2011). 
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shovel-ready now, right now, any redevelopment site, with four corners, 
neat and square.22 The current interest in new urbanism, mixed use, and 
retention of the historic fabric,23 all militate against the 1960’s ethic of 
“slash and burn” redevelopment.24 
What was striking to me as I followed the development of the case was 
not the treatment of Susette Kelo so much as that of Wilhelmina Dery.25 
She was among the nine residents and investment owners of the fifteen 
homes that were petitioners in the case. She lived in a house on Walbach 
Street that her family had owned for more than 100 years.26 She was born 
there, in that house, on February 20, 1918, and in 1946 her husband, 
Charles, moved into that house when they married.27 Wilhelmina and 
Charles Dery’s son, also a petitioner, lived next door in a house given to 
him as a wedding gift.28 Wilhelmina Dery lived on through the decision of 
the U.S. Supreme Court but died on March 13, 2006, nine months after the 
Court’s decision, in the very room where she was born.29  
Today, a decade after she died, the site remains undeveloped.30  We 
can argue why it is in that condition. Certainly, the Great Recession may 
have been sufficient to stop the development. But here is the real 
question—why even at the time of the taking, with a hopeful future, was it 
necessary to immediately take the fee simple interest of Wilhelmina and 
Charles Dery? They were in their eighties when their property was taken. 
Why was it not possible to take just the remainder interest in their property 
and leave them with a life estate, with the ability to stay on in the house 
were Wilhelmina had been born, until they both died or decided on their 
own that they needed to move on? Horton and Levesque say nothing about 
                                                                                                                          
22 See VIRGINIA LEE BURTON, MIKE MULLIGAN AND HIS STEAM SHOVEL (1939). And look where 
Mary Anne, the steam shovel, ended up after furiously digging a basement with four corners, neat and 
square. 
23 See, e.g., Principles of Urbanism, NEW URBANISM, www.newurbanism.org/newurbanism/ 
principles.html [https://perma.cc/XBE7-LS92] (last visited Apr. 16, 2016); CONGRESS FOR NEW 
URBANISM, www.cnu.org [https://perma.cc/NXE9-MCP9] (last visited Apr. 16, 2016). 
24 See, e.g., Sharon Zukin, Gentrification as Market and Place, in THE GENTRIFICATION 
DEBATES: A READER 37, 40 (Japonica Brown-Saracino ed., 2010) (“For a long time, demolition 
signified improvement.”). 
25 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 494–95 (2005). 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Lynne Tuchy, Fort Trumbull Plaintiff Dies, HARTFORD COURANT (Mar. 15, 2006), 
http://articles.courant.com/2006-03-15/news/0603150758_1_takings-wilhelmina-dery-new-london-s-
fort-trumbull [https://perma.cc/SX77-JCGR]. 
30 Ilya Somin, The Story Behind Kelo v. City of New London—How an Obscure Takings Case 
Got to the Supreme Court and Shocked the Nation, WASH. POST (May 29, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/05/29/the-story-behind-the-kelo-
case-how-an-obscure-takings-case-came-to-shock-the-conscience-of-the-nation/ [https://perma.cc/AK 
X2-PJKM]. 
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how we might make the process kinder and gentler for those who might 
suffer the greatest from having their property taken, suffering in ways that 
can never be compensated for money alone. For eight years, Wilhelmina 
lived with the cloud of the eminent domain taking over her head. 
Not every building needs to be taken to make every redevelopment 
work. Remarkably, there was one building, one that was not blighted, that 
somehow did not become part of any of the area plans, and was not taken. 
That was the Italian Dramatic Club at 79 Goshen Street in Parcel 3.31 Early 
in the week that the case was to be argued in the U.S. Supreme Court, 
Professor Richard A. Epstein and Professor J. Peter Byrne discussed the 
case, with Professor Epstein offering this about the Italian Dramatic Club:  
This case illustrates the corrupt (or at least monumentally 
stupid) decisions that local governments can make. Virtually 
all of the 90 acres are already in public hands. The mess-up 
with the hotel which was supposed to serve the Pfizer plant 
has nothing to do with Susette Kelo and company. It reflects 
an ossified public process that moves so slowly that Pfizer 
has found other places to house people who use its facility. 
The park and remediation of an extravagant scale can take 
place without condemning these homes. The Italian Dramatic 
Club lies in the middle of this supposed flood plain and yet is 
spared, while the Brelesky house that abuts it is taken 
over. . . . Peter, you speak about the need to assemble large 
contiguous plots of land. But this the City already has with 
over 90 acres in hand and it can’t figure out what to do with 
them because the local economy doesn't support its grandiose 
ambitions. Yet when politics intervene, it will craft a 
convenient exception from the grim urban reaper. Hence the 
Italian Dramatic Club is spared from condemnation when the 
Brelesky house that abuts it is not.32 
If the club could be preserved, and one might ask to what end, why 
couldn’t the Derys be allowed to retain a life estate and have the 
government only take the remainder interest? And why couldn’t the 
development plan work around some or all of the holdouts and integrate 
them into the redevelopment plan? The same question might be asked with 
regard to Berman’s non-blighted department store: Why could it not have 
                                                                                                                          
31 Tom Blumer, Nearly 10 Years Later, Monument to Favoritism in Kelo Ruling Still Stands, 
MRC NEWSBUSTERS (Jan. 7, 2009, 4:30 PM), http://www.newsbusters.org/blogs/tom-blumer/2009/ 
01/07/nearly-10-years-later-monument-favoritism-kelo-ruling-still-stands [https://perma.cc/UV3C-
PK6L]. 
32 Richard A. Epstein & J. Peter Byrne, Can Your Town Take Your Home?, LEGAL AFFAIRS (Feb. 
21, 2005), http://www.legalaffairs.org/webexclusive/debateclub_emdom0205.msp [https://perma.cc/6S 
KJ-GMVB]. 
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been integrated as part of a mixed-use development instead of destroying it 
to make way for a monoculture of residential uses?   
IV. EMPOWERMENT 
The sense you get from Benedict’s description of the property owners 
is their relative lack of power in the face of the government’s plan. Most 
property owners have little or no bargaining power against the government. 
They justifiably feel overpowered, which they are, when the government 
says it wants and will have their property.  Horton admitted as much during 
oral argument: “The large share of it was [voluntarily sold], but of course, 
that’s because there is always in the background the possibility of being 
able to condemn it. I mean, that obviously facilitates a lot of voluntary 
sales.”33 When they do fight, as they did here, they might be accused of 
causing the project’s failure, as Horton and Levesque argue in saying that 
“without drawn-out litigation the plan might actually have succeeded!”34 
What to do? Maybe we should experiment with civil Gideon 
protection35 and provide by statute for the cost of free representation for 
property owners who cannot otherwise afford a lawyer to represent them in 
the negotiation and, if necessary, in the litigation of eminent domain 
takings. Maybe for those who can afford lawyers, there might be an 
attorney’s fees provision in every case, not just those where, as in some 
states, the property gets an award significantly above that offered by the 
government.36 Property owners might have the right to submit their legal 
costs to the court or be reimbursed by the government if the cases are 
settled short of trial. Should not the cost of representation of property 
owners be a part of the public’s obligation when there is a forced assembly, 
with the burden spread over all of the benefitted citizens instead of being 
borne solely by the private property owners?   
More likely of adoption and already proven to be successful is the 
property rights ombudsman. The ombudsman, an employee of the state, 
provides information and guidance for private property owners whose 
                                                                                                                          
33 Transcript of Oral Argument at 34, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (No. 04-
108).  
34 Horton & Levesque, supra note 4, at 1410. 
35 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). See generally Civil Gideon Corner, 
PHILADELPHIA BAR ASSOCIATION, http://www.philadelphiabar.org/page/CivilGideon [https://perma.cc/ 
M9U8-VUYZ] (last visited Mar. 21, 2016) (“The term ‘civil Gideon’ refers to a growing national 
movement that has developed to explore strategies to provide legal counsel, as a matter of right and at 
public expense, to low-income persons in civil legal proceedings where basic human needs are at stake, 
such as those involving shelter and child custody.”); John Pollock, It’s All About Justice: Gideon and 
the Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 39 HUM. RTS., no. 4, 2013; Moving Towards Civil Gideon: 2014 
Legal Assistance Partnership Conference, NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION (2014), https:// 
www.nysba.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=51554 [https://perma.cc/EB6F-EX43]. 
36 See, e.g., N.Y. EM. DOM. PROC. LAW § 701 (Consol. 2016). 
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property is proposed to be taken. They provide some empowerment for the 
private property owners. Regrettably, they have been little used. Utah, 
Missouri, and Virginia appear to be the only states with eminent domain or 
property rights ombudsmen.37 Connecticut had one for a few years but it 
was eliminated, ostensibly for budget reasons.38   
Utah’s program39 is exemplary. The state’s description reads: 
The Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman protects the 
property rights of the citizens of Utah. The Office helps 
citizens and government agencies understand and comply 
with property rights laws, resolves property rights disputes, 
and advocates for fairness and balance when private rights 
conflict with public needs.40 
Neither the Utah nor Missouri ombudsmen appear to be on short 
leashes.41 For example, on a page with photographs of many fine looking 
single-family homes, the Missouri ombudsman says:  
Do you think your home is safe from eminent domain abuse? 
So did these Missouri homeowners. These are just a few 
                                                                                                                          
37 STATE OF MISSOURI, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS (last visited Mar. 21, 
2016); Press Release, Virginia Department of Transportation, VDOT Announces Establishment of 
Ombudsman Function to Assist Public with Right of Way Transactions (June 24, 2014) (on file with 
author). 
38 Annual Report 2007–2008, OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS, 
http://www.ct.gov/pro/lib/pro/documents/annual_report_2007-08.pdf [https://perma.cc/SZZ3-DDH5] 
(last visited Mar. 21, 2016); Annual Report 2008–2009, OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN FOR PROPERTY 
RIGHTS, http://www.ct.gov/pro/lib/pro/documents/annual_report_2008-09.pdf [https://perma.cc/2KWT 
-4MSC] (last visited Mar. 21, 2016); Connecticut Office of Ombudsman for Property Rights Closes, 
OWNER’S COUNSEL OF AMERICA (Sept. 10, 2009), http://www.ownerscounsel.com/connecticut-office-
of-ombudsman-for-property-rights-closes/ [https://perma.cc/4E5T-QA96]. There was a mediation 
process as well. Process of Mediation of Disputes Between Property Owners and Public Agencies 
Concerning the Use of Eminent Domain or Related Relocation Assistance, OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN 
FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS, http://www.ct.gov/sots/lib/sots/regulations/title_48/052.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
DFC6-QCQ6] (last visited Mar. 21, 2016). 
39 UTAH DEP’T OF COMMERCE OFFICE OF THE PROPERTY RIGHTS OMBUDSMAN, WELCOME TO 
THE PROPERTY RIGHTS OMBUDSMAN UTAH DEP’T OF COMMERCE (last visited Mar. 21, 2016), 
http://propertyrights.utah.gov/ [https://perma.cc/ZRM3-YEME]. 
40 Id. 
41 Virginia’s is within its Department of Transportation and it is unclear how independently it 
operates. Right of Way Ombudsman Charter, VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 
ASSURANCE AND COMPLIANCE OFFICE (2014), http://www.virginiadot.org/business/resources/Right_of 
_Way_Ombudsman_Charter_061114.pdf [https://perma.cc/B29W-RZAZ]. Missouri’s law does not 
allow the ombudsman to give legal advice: “The office of public counsel shall create an office of 
ombudsman for property rights by appointing a person to the position of ombudsman. The ombudsman 
shall assist citizens by providing guidance, which shall not constitute legal advice, to individuals 
seeking information regarding the condemnation process and procedures. The ombudsman shall 
document the use of eminent domain within the state and any issues associated with its use and shall 
submit a report to the general assembly on January 1, 2008, and on such date each year thereafter.” MO. 
ANN. STAT. § 523.277 (2016). 
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examples of the many homes that are considered part of a 
“blighted” area in an attempt by condemning authorities to 
strip these homeowners of their property rights in order to 
build strip malls.42 
Utah law requires that any agency intending to use eminent domain to 
acquire private property provide the property owner with certain 
disclosures,43 all of which can be found in a 46-page document, “Your 
Guide to Just Compensation: What to Do When The Government Wants to 
Acquire Land” promulgated by the Utah Office of the Property Rights 
Ombudsman.44 Those disclosures are laid out in twenty-seven 
paragraphs,45 including the right to fair market value,46 access to public 
documents,47 open meetings,48 disclosure of other property owners whose 
property is being taken,49 a statement of the public purpose for the taking,50 
and the right to accompany the agency’s appraiser during his or her 
inspection of the property and to talk to that appraiser before the value is 
determined.51 In addition, homeowners have a right to receive a copy of the 
appraisal.52 A second appraisal may be provided at the agency’s expense if 
the property owner has requested mediation through the office of the 
property rights ombudsman and the mediator or arbitrator in the matter 
makes the determination that such an appraisal is reasonably necessary to 
resolve the issue of just compensation.53 The Utah law allows supplemental 
damages beyond fair market value for improvements on the property that 
contribute to the value and to have the agency provide a replacement 
dwelling, including an obligation to pay additional compensation where the 
just compensation offered is insufficient to pay for an appropriate 
replacement.54 
Craig Call, Utah’s first property rights ombudsman, offered an 
insider’s, first-person perspective on how this has worked in Utah.55 The 
                                                                                                                          
42 Blighted Missouri, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS, https://eminentdom 
ain.mo.gov/blighted.htm [https://perma.cc/RA55-8HPU] (last visited Mar. 21, 2016). 
43 UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-505 (2016). 
44 Your Guide to Just Compensation, STATE OF UTAH OFFICE OF THE PROPERTY RIGHTS 
OMBUDSMAN (2011), https://utahpropertyrights.files.wordpress.com/2013/05/your-guide-to-just-comp-
nov-2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/EJE6-96L3]. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-511 (2016). 
55 Craig M. Call, Speech from the Eighth Annual New York Conference on Private Property 
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short version is that it has worked very well to bring the parties to 
settlement and avoid litigation. With the ombudsman and new techniques 
for alternative dispute resolution, the Utah Department of Transportation 
reports that litigation has been reduced 75%.56 That is not a typographic 
error – a 75% reduction in litigation. The budget is small, just $150,000 
year in 2004,57 and the office even has the power to pay for independent 
appraisals.58 A state that does not have a property rights ombudsman is 
pennywise and pound-foolish. 
V. COURT’S FAILURE TO PROVIDE ANY GUIDES OR STANDARDS 
Horton and Levesque end their discussion of the first of the four words 
by noting Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion with what is as close to 
any real guidance on what standards must characterize the process in order 
for it to be defensible.59 The most that one can glean from the concurrence 
is that there must be a plan, an adequate process, and the ability to vote the 
elected officials who make eminent domain decisions out of office at some 
later time.60 
In perpetuating the precedential status quo, the Court did nothing to 
provide guidance for better decision-making. Everyone affected by 
eminent domain deserves better. The Court passed up an opportunity to 
adopt the clear thinking of the Michigan Supreme Court in Wayne County 
v. Hathcock, where that court overturned its 1981 “Poletown” ruling and 
held that a “public use” must be for just that, a use by the public such as a 
park, an airport, or a highway.61  
In 1981, the Michigan Supreme Court upheld the city of Detroit’s 
condemnation of a substantial area of private, largely residential property 
to be conveyed to General Motors Corporation to construct an automobile 
                                                                                                                          
Rights, PROP. RTS. FOUND. OF AM. (2004), http://prfamerica.org/speeches/8th/UtahPropRtsOmbuds 
man.html [https://perma.cc/KBG9-KJ7H]. 
56 Craig M. Call, Resolving Land Use and Impact Fee Disputes: Utah’s Innovative Ombudsman 
Program, A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/real_property_trust_estate/annu 
al_meeting/2011/materials/annual_rpte_2011_property_rights_call_utah_ombudsman_program.authch
eckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/P9BK-3F7Z] (last visited Mar. 21, 2016); Leonard Gilroy, States Should 
Establish Ombudsmen to Protect Private Property Rights, REASON FOUND. (Apr. 17, 2008), 
http://reason.org/news/show/states-should-establish-ombuds [https://perma.cc/372Y-KQSR]; 
Ombudsman Act, AM. LEGIS. EXCHANGE COUNCIL, http://www.alec.org/model-policy/ombudsman-act/ 
[https://perma.cc/79F5-5HRV] (last visited Mar. 21, 2016). 
57 Call, supra note 55. 
58 Id. 
59 Horton & Levesque, supra note 4, at 1418. 
60 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 492 (2005). 
61 County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 770 (Mich. 2004); Patricia E. Salkin, Zoning 
and Land Use Planning: Michigan Supreme Court Overturns Eminent Domain Case, 33 REAL ESTATE 
L.J. 478 (2005). 
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assembly plant in Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit.62 The Court 
said: “The power of eminent domain is to be used in this instance primarily 
to accomplish the essential public purposes of alleviating unemployment 
and revitalizing the economic base of the community. The benefit to a 
private interest is merely incidental.”63 The takings included over 1,000 
properties, and the homes of 3,438 people.64  
Hathcock arose out of the County Airport renovation in which Wayne 
County had invested about $2 billion and was then faced with problems 
related to increased aircraft noise.65 The county started buying up land 
using among other funds $21 million provided by the Federal Aviation 
Administration, acquiring about 500 acres in many parcels near the 
airport.66 Some of the parcels were not connected with any others.67 
Because the county was required to use the federal funds for economic 
development it proposed a business and technology park as part of the 
airport project.68 The site for the proposed business and technology park 
was large, some 1,300 acres.69 To get that much land the county started 
buying up more property totaling another 500 acres.70  The county came up 
short, however, in terms of getting a sufficiently contiguous land 
                                                                                                                          
62 Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 457 (Mich. 1981), overruled by 
Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765. 
63 Id. at 459. The court had noted, “We are persuaded the terms [public use and public purpose] 
have been used interchangeably in Michigan statutes and decisions in an effort to describe the protean 
concept of public benefit.” Id. at 457. Professor John Mogk of Wayne State University describes 
Poletown as a success:  
The city acquired land for General Motors in Detroit’s declining Poletown 
neighborhood through eminent domain in the 1980s to build a $2 billion auto-
assembly plant that today is the largest operating industrial facility in the city and 
one of GM’s flagship plants. It has provided 3,000 jobs in the community and 
15,000 additional allied jobs in parts and service industries for more than three 
decades, and generated hundreds of millions of dollars of property and income-tax 
revenue, more than accomplishing its economic purpose.  
John E, Mogk, Eminent Domain’s Poletown Success, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 5, 2015), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/eminent-domains-poletown-success-1438726651 [https://perma.cc/NC64-
8MF6]. But see Timothy Sandefur, A Gleeful Obituary for Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit, 
28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 651 (2005) (arguing that overturning Poletown “vindicate[d] an important 
legal principle to protect people from what the founding fathers called ‘the mischiefs of faction’” 
(citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison))). 
64 See Wendell E. Pritchett, The “Public Menace” of Blight: Urban Renewal and the Private Uses 
of Eminent Domain, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 48 (2003); Stephen Jones, Note, Trumping Eminent 
Domain Law: An Argument for Strict Scrutiny Analysis Under the Public Use Requirement of the Fifth 
Amendment, 50 SYRACUSE L. REV. 285, 295 (2000). 
65 Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 770. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 771. 
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assemblage, so it begin a formal process of eminent domain, negotiating 
voluntary sales from twenty-seven of the property owners, leaving 19 to be 
acquired by eminent domain.71 Those takings were challenged as not being 
for a public purpose.72 The trial and appellate courts upheld the use of 
eminent domain for this assemblage, finding precedent in the Poletown 
decision.73 
In reversing Poletown, the Michigan Supreme Court acknowledged 
that its state constitution did not preclude the transfer of property taken by 
eminent domain to a private entity but that such transfer was not 
permissible if it was for a private use.74 And it is here that the Hathcock 
decision is instructive of the analysis that the U.S. Supreme Court could 
have followed in Kelo and which would have provided far better guidance 
than what was offered and what Horton and Levesque can fabricate out of 
Kennedy’s concurrence. 
The Michigan court first held that Wayne County was authorized to 
exercise the power of eminent domain and that this particular exercise was 
within the county’s powers.75  
A transition from a declining rustbelt economy to a growing, 
technology-driven economy would, no doubt, promote 
prosperity and general welfare. Consequently, the county’s 
goal of drawing commerce to metropolitan Detroit and its 
environs by converting the subject properties to a state-of-
the-art technology and business park is within this definition 
of a “public purpose.”76  
The court also found it was “necessary”77 and “for the use or benefit of 
the public”78 under the state’s statutes. 
In ultimately determining that the proposed condemnations were not 
“for public use” under the Michigan constitution,79 the court found that it 
should apply what is the “common understanding” of the term, quoting 
Justice Cooley: “[The] Constitution is made for the people and by the 
people. The interpretation that should be given it is that which reasonable 
minds, the great mass of the people themselves, would give it.”80  
What followed next in the analysis and the decision is a remarkable 
                                                                                                                          
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 787. 
75 Id. at 776. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 777. 
78 Id. at 778. 
79 Id. at 781. 
80 Id. at 779 (emphasis omitted) (quoting In re Proposal C, 185 N.W.2d 9 (Mich. 1971)).  
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road map for eminent domain decision-making where the property is 
ultimately turned over to a private entity for redevelopment. The court 
described its challenge as one of finding “the area between these poles” – 
the permissible condemnation of private property ultimately conveyed to a 
private entity for a public use and that which is ultimately conveyed to a 
private entity for private use.81 
First, the court noted the precedent in Michigan to the conveyance to a 
private entity must be one of “public necessity of the extreme sort 
otherwise impracticable,”82 citing a prior decision describing “those 
enterprises generating public benefit whose very existence depends on the 
use of land that can be assembled only by the coordination central 
government alone is capable of achieving” and including “highways, 
roads, canals, and other instrumentalities.”83   
This notion of the necessity of collective action to acquire property for 
the “instrumentalities of commerce” would not necessarily preclude the 
acquisition of the properties at Fort Trumbull, but would require a 
demonstration that it was absolutely necessary to carry out the public 
purpose.   
The second requirement that the court noted as necessary where 
condemned property is transferred to a private entity is that there be some 
continuing public oversight, some involvement or control by the public.84 
This too would not have been a problem at Fort Trumbull if the acquired 
property were subject to long-term or perpetual covenants and easements 
with a reverter back to the government in the event that the private 
developer failed to use the property for a public use.85 Indeed, the 
increasing use of public-private partnerships enables government to stay 
involved as a partner with private entities managing and controlling the use 
of the land that is acquired while insuring continuing dedication to public 
use. Remember, ownership, even control, is not necessarily the same as 
use. 
Finally, the Michigan court found that it was permissible to transfer 
property to a private entity when the land acquired was itself a matter of 
public concern, as would be the case for the removal of blighted properties 
that are a hazard to the public's health and safety.86 The ultimate transfer of 
the land acquired under these conditions to a private entity is incidental to 
                                                                                                                          
81 Id. at 781. 
82 Id. (quoting Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 478 (Mich. 
1981) (Ryan, J., dissenting)). 
83 Id. (quoting Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 478 (Ryan, J., dissenting)). 
84 Id. at 782. 
85 See id. at 784 (describing how no formal mechanisms existed to ensure that the Pinnacle Project 
benefited the public). Had some mechanism existed, the court would have ruled differently on this 
element. 
86 Id. at 782–83. 
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the removal of the blight.87  
The Michigan Supreme Court essentially adopted Justice Ryan’s 
dissenting opinion in the Poletown case in summarizing its three-part test 
as follows:88 
The foregoing indicates that the transfer of condemned 
property to a private entity, seen through the eyes of an 
individual sophisticated in the law at the time of ratification 
of our 1963 Constitution, would be appropriate in one of 
three contexts: (1) where “public necessity of the extreme 
sort” requires collective action; (2) where the property 
remains subject to public oversight after transfer to a private 
entity; and (3) where the property is selected because of 
“facts of independent public significance,” rather than the 
interests of the private entity to which the property is 
eventually transferred.89  
The proposed business and technology park failed this three-part test. 
First, there was ample opportunity for a similar development in the area.90 
Second, there was no public oversight.91 Third, the acquisition of the land, 
in and of itself, did not serve the public good because there was no 
“independent public significance” such as the elimination of a hazard that 
would support the use of the eminent domain power.92 
The Hathcock decision came down on July 30, 2004, just eleven 
months before the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo.93 How much 
better the Kelo decision would have been had a similar thorough, 
thoughtful analysis been followed and more definitive guidance given to 
decision makers. Would the Fort Trumbull project still have been held to 
be for a public purpose? No one should dismiss Hathcock by saying that it 
is a state court decision interpreting state statutes and a state constitution.94 
                                                                                                                          
87 Id. at 783.  
88 Id. at 781 (citing Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 478–80 (Ryan, J., dissenting)).  
89 Id. at 783. 
90 Id. at 783–84. 
91 Id. at 784. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 765; Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
94 In 2015, the Michigan Supreme Court compared Kelo and Hathcock, noting the more protective 
Michigan constitution:  
Compare, for example, Kelo v. New London . . . with Wayne Co. v. Hathcock . . . . 
Kelo held that the requirement of U.S. Const., Ams. V and IX that eminent domain 
be exercised for a “public use” was satisfied when the city sought to condemn 
property and transfer it to private entities upon a showing that the transfer would 
create an economic benefit to the community; essentially, the government can “take” 
private property when the taking advanced a “public purpose.” In contrast, Hathcock 
held that the requirement of Const. 1963, art. 10, § 2 that eminent domain be 
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That is not the point. Hathcock is simply a good example of an in-depth, 
carefully articulated analysis, something the U.S. Supreme Court did not 
do. 
VI. ANOTHER ALTERNATIVE—LAND ASSEMBLY 
The principal argument for eminent domain for redevelopment is that 
it is absolutely necessary when private parties are unable to assemble 
sufficient contiguous land to make an economic project.95 Horton and 
Levesque do not mention private land assembly, sometimes called land 
readjustment, as an alternative to eminent domain. Remarkably absent 
from all of the reaction to Kelo has been any initiative to develop the law 
in this country to facilitate private land assembly. In other countries, 
among them Germany, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Netherlands, and 
Australia, there are “land readjustment” systems enabling entrepreneurs, 
developers, and groups of property owners to come together, to assemble 
land.96 In doing so, they can capture the assemblage value that is not 
compensable when property is taken by public eminent domain and 
monetize it when they sell the assemblage to a developer or participate in 
some capacity such as limited partners, stockholders, or members of a 
corporation.97 If there are holdouts, their properties can be taken. 
Generally, the process begins with the individual property owners 
approving the land readjustment plan and then giving up their properties.98  
One knowledgeable commentator has advocated a process of land 
assembly that begins with assembling the landowners, working with them 
to find the shared goals and objectives and developing an approach that is a 
true public-private partnership.99 A variation on this concept is the 
                                                                                                                          
exercised for “public use” was violated when the county sought to condemn 
property and transfer it to private entities in order to facilitate economic 
development. We explained that the public-use requirement forbids the forced 
transfer of private property to a private entity for a private use and held that 
economic benefit to a community, without more, did not constitute a “public use,” 
even though it could be construed as a “public purpose.”  
Aft Michigan v. Michigan, 866 N.W.2d 782, 794 n.9 (Mich. 2015) (citations omitted). 
95 E.g., Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 781–82 (describing a hypothetical scenario where the use of 
eminent domain is necessary to complete public projects). 
96 ROBERT H. NELSON & EILEEN NORCROSS, MERCATUS CENTER, MOVING PAST KELO: A NEW 
INSTITUTION FOR LAND ASSEMBLY—COLLECTIVE NEIGHBORHOOD BARGAINING ASSOCIATIONS 
(CNBAS), at 6–10 (2009). 
97 Lynne B. Sagalyn, Land Assembly, Land Readjustment, and Public-Private Redevelopment, in 
ANALYZING LAND READJUSTMENT: ECONOMICS, LAW, AND COLLECTIVE ACTION 159, 170 (Yu-Hung 
Hong & Barrie Needham eds., 2007). 
98 See George W. Liebmann, Land Readjustment for America: A Proposal for a Statute, 32 URB. 
LAW. 1, 2 (2000) (describing the beginning steps of a land readjustment plan). 
99 Frank Schnidman, Land Assembly by Assembling People, 30 ZONING & PLAN. L. REP. 1, 3 
(2007).  
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collective neighborhood bargaining association to negotiate for the 
neighborhood and extract the assemblage value.100 He identifies George 
Washington as the first real land readjustment entrepreneur in America in 
assembling seventeen large farm tracts to create the nation’s capital.101 
Washington negotiated an agreement dated March 30, 1791, by which the 
land owners conveyed with charge portions of their land needed for streets, 
parks, and similar public uses and sold additional land at $57 an acre for 
government buildings and in return they received building lots laid out by 
the government and apportioned between the private land owners and the 
Federal government.102 No eminent domain.103 
Private land assembly is extremely difficult without enabling 
legislation to address the issue of holdouts.  When successful, the rewards 
for all the stakeholders can be great, as they were in the New York City 
42nd Street Development Project.104 Many land assembly attempts, 
however, fail.  
Back in the mid-1990s, not far from the University of Connecticut 
School of Law, there was an attempt by a private land developer working 
with a group of neighbors across from Westfarms Mall, on the border of 
West Hartford and Farmington, to assemble the lots in a 1960s era 
subdivision of split-level homes known as Astronaut Village105 into a 
parcel large enough for a retail project. Neighborhood opposition 
overwhelmed the developer attempting the land assembly.  It was an ill-
considered attempt but illustrative of the challenges, especially when the 
initiative comes from outside.106   
VII. ASSEMBLAGE  
A.  Kelo’s One-Way Street (“Federalism”) 
Horton and Levesque say that “federalism is alive and well after Kelo. 
Those who extol the virtues of federalism elsewhere should be praising 
                                                                                                                          
100 NELSON & NORCROSS, supra note 96, at 1. 
101 Schnidman, supra note 99, at 3–4. 
102 Id. at 4. 
103 Id. at 3–4. 
104 See Sagalyn, supra note 97, at 168 (describing that even after many delays and lawsuits, the 
last phase of condemnation is now complete).  
105 So called because the streets are named after astronauts. 
106 See Daniela Altimari, Developer Ends Bid to Buy Homes in West Hartford, HARTFORD 
COURANT (Sept. 19, 1997), http://articles.courant.com/1997-09-19/news/9709190503_1_commercial-
sprawl-neighborhood-developer [https://perma.cc/QP9U-GYWT] (describing the developers’ 
awareness that the project was a “longshot”); Daniela Altimari, Astronaut Village Now Small Sea of 
Tranquility, HARTFORD COURANT (Aug. 22, 2001), http://articles.courant.com/2001-08-
22/news/0108220171_1_neighborhood-shopping-mall-target-store [https://perma.cc/C57C-S46D] 
(“Most residents vigorously fought the plan, banding together at town meetings and over kitchen 
tables.”). 
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Kelo.”107 What they ignore is that the Kelo decision is blind to some of the 
good work going on in the states with regard to the issues before the court 
of what is a public use and what kind of standards and tests the courts 
should be using. The Kelo Court offers very little guidance. Indeed, Horton 
and Levesque are forced to fall back on Kennedy’s concurring opinion and 
argue that it should be the basis for further development of the law in both 
the federal and state courts.108 
Hathcock is mentioned just once and that is in the dissenting opinion 
solely for the purpose of acknowledging that it overturned the Poletown 
decision.109 As the discussion above of Hathcock suggests, there is much 
that the federal courts, including the High Court, can learn from the states. 
Federalism is a two-way street110 and the failure of the U.S. Supreme 
Court to recognize the work of the states in its majority opinion is an 
affront to federalism. The Court could have, and should have, sampled and 
picked from what the sates have done in coping with the sometimes-
intractable problems of protecting private property rights while advancing 
the interests of the general public. That the majority opinion gives the 
states no good guidance is not a nod to federalism, but as a failure of 
leadership by the Court. 
B.  Show Me the Money (“Compensation”) 
In talking about the third word, compensation, Horton and Levesque 
argue that if the government had lost in Kelo, it would be encouraged to 
expand its use of power thereby damaging property rights without having 
to pay any compensation.111 They offer nothing in support of that 
speculation, and it is merely that – speculation. The U.S. Supreme Court 
has actually limited the more expansive use of regulatory powers, 
particularly through exactions and conditions on approvals.112 The Court 
has strengthened and perhaps even expanded the reach of the Fifth 
Amendment protections for just compensation by finding that it can be 
                                                                                                                          
107 Horton & Levesque, supra note 4, at 1424. 
108 Id. at 1425–27. 
109 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 503 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  
110 See The Roberts Court and Federalism: Minutes from a Convention of the Federalist Society, 
4 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 330, 367 (2008) (statement of audience participant); see also David L. 
Callies, Kelo v. City of New London: Of Planning, Federalism, and a Switch in Time, 28 HAW. L. 
REV. 327, 337 (2006) (“The true ‘essence’ of federalism is that the States as States have legitimate 
interests which the National Government is bound to respect even though its laws are supreme.” 
(quoting Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 581 (1985) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting))).   
111 Horton & Levesque, supra note 4, at 1424–25. 
112 See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2603 (2013) (describing 
that the exactions tests of Nollan and Dolan extended to money exactions and are applicable even 
where the approval is denied because the applicant refuses to accept the condition). 
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used as an affirmative defense to an enforcement action.113 Most recently, 
the Court has granted certiorari in a case involving the so-called relevant 
parcel,114 which may prove to be another way by which the Court may 
expand its protection of private property rights, especially following what 
seems to be the trend with regard to the relevant parcel issue.115 No one 
should fear that private property rights would be endangered as a result of 
more definitive, and perhaps limiting, rules regarding the use of eminent 
domain. 
When it comes to compensation, again it is what Horton and Levesque 
do not say that is remarkable. They speak not to the need for better 
relocation benefits for people who are taken from their homes, for 
recognizing the loss of business goodwill, or for addressing how we might 
come to entitle private property owners to be compensated for the 
assemblage value or at least to be able to participate in part in the 
economic upside of committing their private properties to the public 
interest for redevelopment by public or private parties. Sometimes, the 
justice in just compensation is lacking. They say nothing about the 
possibility of attorney’s fees for private property owners who lose their 
homes and businesses to the government by eminent domain. They say 
nothing about reimbursing private property owners for the real expense of 
defending their rights through appraisers and planners and others who can 
develop evidence and testify as to value. They say nothing about the need 
to balance the scales of justice, to empower the private property owner 
through civil Gideon representation and federal and state supported 
ombudsmen. These are all issues of compensation and even though 
compensation was not an issue before the Court in Kelo, it was the subject 
of some discussion during oral argument.116 It is a concern. 
Horton and Levesque spend barely half a page on compensation and 
two thirds of that is devoted to an argument that property owners should be 
glad that they are not subject to losing their property rights by inverse 
condemnation because with regulatory takings there is much less chance of 
                                                                                                                          
113 See Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 133 S. Ct. 2053, 2063 (2013) (explaining that just compensation 
is due when taking personal property). 
114 See Murr v. State, 859 N.W.2d 628 (Wis. 2014), cert. granted, 84 U.S.L.W. 3097 (U.S. 2016)  
(stating a claim by Petitioners that regulators forced a merger of their two adjoining Wisconsin 
waterfront properties, hindered development, and failed to properly compensate them for the economic 
loss they suffered); see also Lost Tree Village Corp. v. United States, 787 F.3d 1111, 1119 (Fed. Cir. 
2015) (describing the relevant parcel that has been rendered valueless, and holding that a Lucas 
categorical taking had occurred).  
115 State of Property Rights in America Ten Years After Kelo v. City of New London: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution & Civil Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th 
Cong. 1 (2015) (testimony of John M. Groen, Principal Attorney, Pacific Legal Foundation). 
116 Transcript of Oral Argument at 18, 21, 34, 37–38, 40–42, 44, Kelo v. City of New London, 
545 U.S. 469 (2005) (No. 04-108).   
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receiving any compensation.117 That is not a positive argument for eminent 
domain. That also fails to recognize the fundamental problem we have with 
inverse condemnation, with both Lucas118 categorical takings and Penn 
Central119 partial regulatory takings.  I believe that any regulatory activity 
that is in the public interest but has adverse off-site impacts, windfarms 
and low-level radioactive waste sites for example, should include the 
creation of a publically-funded trust fund from which owners of 
economically damaged property may get relief, even for relatively small 
partial takings.  What is lacking in the discourse over both direct takings by 
eminent domain and indirect takings by inverse condemnation is 
consideration of who bears the burden and how we might make it more 
equitable. 
C.  Tyranny by Majority (“Democracy”) 
As I read Horton and Levesque, the majority of people in the 
community, believing that the interests of “public welfare” will be served, 
may if they desire take an individual’s private property, pay just 
compensation, and turn it over to a private developer for economic 
development, so long as they do so through the “democratic process.” And, 
if elected public officials make the decision, the public always has a 
remedy in the right to not reelect them. 
The first of those two arguments is empty without standards, and 
although the authors next turn to pulling Justice Kennedy’s musings up by 
their bootstraps to make something useful out of them, the fact remains 
that democracy means nothing without the rule of law and Kelo does 
nothing to advance the rule of law.120 Horton acknowledged at oral 
argument: “It seems to me democracy can make good decisions and . . . or 
bad decisions under the Constitution . . . .”121 
The second argument, perhaps it can be called “voting the rascals out,” 
is, to use another trite phrase, “closing the barn door after the horses are 
out.”  Neighborhoods destroyed and families irreparably hurt are not 
rebuilt and restored at the ballot box. 
                                                                                                                          
117 Horton & Levesque, supra note 4, at 1424–25. 
118 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Comm’n, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
119 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
120 Dana Berliner characterizes the Court’s decision more strongly, and convincingly, claiming 
that it has “remov[ed] the floor from the Public Use Clause” and that Kelo is a “prime example of 
judicial abdication.”  Dana Berliner, Looking Back Ten Years After Kelo, 125 YALE L.J.F. 82, 91 
(2015). 
121 Transcript of Oral Argument at 39, Kelo, 545 U.S. 469 (No. 04-108). 
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D.  A More Robust Examination of the Use of Eminent Domain 
(Transforming Justice Kennedy’s Test) 
Horton and Levesque, though recognizing that Justice Kennedy’s test 
is “not well developed,”122 offer to transform it into a ten-part analysis,123 
which begins to look more like a detailed legislative enactment than a 
judicial test. To demonstrate how intractable trying to do this will be, take 
just the first factor: “Will a public body own or operate the property?”124 In 
dealing with land assemblage, this really has no meaning. The emergence 
of public-private partnerships has wiped out any of the bright lines of 
ownership. It matters not who owns or operates a property so long as there 
are adequate provisions in place that ensure the assemblage will be used in 
the public’s interest. The same problem is inherent in the factor, “how 
specific is the state use?”125 Uses change, sometimes quite rapidly, and 
frequently before a total plan is implemented. Think of what has happened 
in the movie theater business, in big box retail, in the conversion of office 
towers to residential use, in warehouses turned into offices.  Land uses 
today are less permanent and to commit any site, especially a large site, to 
a particular land use pattern can be damaging. 
What is important about this last section is, again, what is not said. We 
need to focus on how we can assemble parcels of land in the public interest 
without the use of eminent domain; how we can engage private property 
owners as joint venturers in that effort; how we can enable private 
entrepreneurs through land assembly and land readjustment laws to create 
coalitions of property owners who will voluntarily assemble their land; 
how we can allow all private property owners to enjoy the upside of land 
assemblage value enhancements; how we can adequately compensate 
people who are holdouts and displaced; how we can have a “kinder and 
gentler” approach to eminent domain with longer time horizons that enable 
some people to stay on in their homes until they are ready to move on; and 
how we can empower the small-business owner and single-family 
homeowner with the legal and consulting help they need to defend their 
private property rights? 
If we do all that, and if we provide more definitive rules of law in 
constitutional amendments, statutes, and the common law;126 and we 
redirect our energies to ways to avoid eminent domain and when it is 
necessary to use it, to do so in less damaging ways, then we will all be 
                                                                                                                          
122 Horton & Levesque, supra note 4, at 1426. 
123 Id. at 1426–27. 
124 Id. at 1426. 
125 Id. 
126 For a good summary of the response to Kelo that may suggest some actions, see Ilya Somin, 
The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2100 (2009). 
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better off for it.127 
                                                                                                                          
127 As Professor Bethany Berger so aptly puts it: “In the end the decision in Kelo v. New London 
was not a grand victory for the plaintiffs or for New London, for cities or for property owners.” 
Bethany Berger, Kelo v. New London: A Decade Later, 94 TITLE NEWS 27, 28 (2015). 
 
